The authors found that the types of institutions adopted in the
early stages of either kind of colonization strategy persisted even
after the colonies became independent. In extractive states, after
achieving independence, the 1z0-031 dumps new ruling class may have found it
convenient to maintain the existing institutions and use them for their
own benefit rather than incur the cost of switching to the alternative
model. In the democracy-oriented colonies, since the cost of
establishing institutions to impose government checks and secure
private property had already been 1z0-007 latest dumps incurred by the colonial power, it
was easier for the new independent country to maintain these
institutions rather than switch to an extractive model.Economists Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer defend the second view—that it is
economic growth which stimulates democracy or the adoption of better
institutions, and not the opposite. They 1zo-051 dumps further make the point that
the accumulation of human capital is a more important determinant of
economic growth than political institutions. They studied a large set
of countries in the period 1960 to 2000, classifying them into four
categories: autocracies, imperfect db2 dumps 730 autocracies, imperfect democracies
and stable (or perfect) democracies. Their measure of democracy
captures basic government practices in a combination of institutional
and behavioral indicators, such as competitiveness of political
participation, openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment,
and constraints on the executive.